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Rivera: Diversity and the Law

DIVERSITY AND THE LAW
Jenny Rivera*
Thank you Dean Eric Lane for inviting me to deliver this year's
Howard and Iris Kaplan Memorial Lecture.
The goal of this lecture series is to bring jurists to address the
community on important and timely legal issues. A worthy goal indeed,
of which I am honored to be invited to further by my comments
this afternoon. As I was considering what might be an appropriate
topic, I thought about the variety of legal issues that our high court
decides. I thought a discussion on procedure might be of interest because
many a lawyer has failed to appreciate, to the detriment of the client, the
scope of our jurisdiction as well as our preservation rules. Perhaps a
discussion on some arcane aspect of appealability or the mootness
doctrine would stir intellectual curiosity and provide a basis for
future conversations.
I eventually settled on a very different topic, but I consider it no
less important than the areas mentioned above. Rather than address
what might otherwise appear to be the weeds in which we toil as
jurists, I have decided to discuss diversity within the legal profession,
and specifically, the judiciary. I consider this topic timely and of
great concern to the legal profession and the greater society because it
requires us to think critically about expectations and hopes for the future
of our democratic system of government. The changing demographics of
both the profession and our population demand that we approach this
issue with an eye to a candid and open dialogue about what these
undeniable changes mean for our judiciary, our justice system, and the
rule of law.
Diversity, of course, is a regular topic of discussion across a broad
spectrum of institutions and professions. It is discussed in academic
* Associate Judge, New York State Court of Appeals. The opinions expressed in this Article
are the author's own and do not reflect the views of the New York State Court of Appeals or the
New York State Unified Court system. This Article is adapted from the Howard and Iris Kaplan
Memorial Lecture, delivered by Judge Rivera on November 6, 2014, at the Maurice A. Deane
School of Law at Hofstra University.
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circles, legal circles, among politicians, the military, and within the
private business sector. For some, talking about diversity is part of the
office culture. It can be a controversial topic charged with emotional
components, such as who should share in the resources of our country,
be offered admission to a particular school, or hold a particular type of
job. It can be part of a thought exercise, such as imagining the impact of
"sameness" and "difference" on society and individuals.
I cannot explore all of the permutations of this topic that by
necessity (and experience) are implicated by the diversity of the concept
of "diversity." Instead, I provide research, data, and the attendant
considerations inherent to a discussion of diversity in the legal
profession. Be forewarned that I do not speak as to my own conclusions.
Rather, I share a variety of the current thoughts on this topic. My hope is
to inform even those well versed on the issues and, perhaps, stimulate
future discussion, slightly moving the dial towards a greater
consideration of this subject.
Let us begin with what diversity means. Diversity is defined as "the
quality or state of having many different forms, types, ideas" and "the
state of having people who are different races or who have different
cultures in a group or organization." 1 The term dates back to the
fourteenth century to the word "diverse," 2 which is defined as "differing
from one another."3 Similarly, Black's Law Dictionarydefines diversity
as "[e]thnic, socioeconomic, and gender heterogeneity within a group"
and "the combination within a population of people with different
backgrounds."4 It also references our Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence and states that the U.S. Supreme Court "has found
5
diversity in education to be a compelling government interest.",
I have no quarrel with these defmitions, but they are quite general
and only get us so far because diversity has meant a particular type of
difference-a way of thinking about identity. It has usually focused on
racial, ethnic, and gender characteristics. For this discussion, I adopt
these same identifiers of self with two important additions, which are not
based on physical characteristics but may be influenced by one's
identity. I add to today's working definition diversity of professional
experience and socioeconomic status.

1. Diversity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diversity?
utm_campaign=sd&utmmedium-serp&utm source=jsonld (last visited July 24, 2016).
2. Id.
3. Diverse, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diverse (last
visited July 24, 2016).
4. Diversity,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
5. Id.(citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-28 (2003)).
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Definition without context is, however, only half the story.
Diversity must be considered against the backdrop of its historical roots,
which I describe as a movement to ensure that those disadvantaged by
legally-sanctioned and social inequality have an equal opportunity to
participate in society and enjoy the benefits of the fruits of their own and
their ancestors' labor. Diversity efforts may reflect attempts to remedy
past injuries. While victims of some of the most pernicious wrongs may
no longer live to collect compensation, or otherwise benefit from the
sacrifices made in the past, diversity remedies inure to the benefit of
those who today experience the legacy of former legalized oppression.
Any serious consideration of the concept of "diversity" requires an
understanding of the purpose for diversification and critical analysis of
its application to the legal profession and our system of justice. This
alone requires debate and discourse. For the purposes of this discussion,
I will simply assert that there appear to be three publicly, generally
recognized goals of diversity. All three are transformative in one way or
another, and as in all things human, they are limited in the extent to
which they effectuate change. Even assuming some other obvious
purpose, we can still use this short list of goals as a working basis for
our exploration of diversity.
The first goal is to establish a profession that represents the broad
diversity of our population. This is change grounded in demographics
and data. We accomplish this goal by simply changing the percentages
of those in the profession who represent any particular group to match
(or approximate) their number in the broader society. This has the
attraction of simplicity, even if it seems a rather unsophisticated
approach to a complex and contested issue.
The second goal in many ways justifies the effort necessary to
achieve the first goal, for this second goal relies on diversity as proof
that our legal system is purged of barriers based on race, ethnicity,
gender, and other unacceptable forms of categorizing individuals.
Supported by research and factual analysis of the impact of
heterogeneity on individual and group behavior, this goal relies on the
presumption that diversity minimizes the potential for bias and reduces
the deployment of stereotypes as a basis for action and decision-making.
That is to say, as more of the historical targets of bias are present in
the workforce, hold leadership positions, and are treated as equals under
the law, co-workers, supervisors, and employers will adjust their
behavior to comport with these demonstrated examples of the values of
equality. A corollary to this goal is that a system purged of bias results
in the selection of highly qualified individuals who are chosen based
on merit.
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The third goal of diversity is to engender and increase public
confidence in the administration of justice and create an environment
supporting a popular belief that the system is fair. This strikes me as
the most misunderstood of the goals described because it requires
an understanding and an acceptance of an outsider's perspective to the
law. It requires us to recognize that some members of our population
believe there can be no justice if they do not see someone like
themselves in positions of power and influence, such as those held by
lawyers and judges.
It may be difficult to accept that this perspective applies to legal
actors because in our profession we say the rule of law guides us-not
prejudice, not bias, and not commonality of economic position. So, this
is where the rubber hits the road. It must be recognized that even if a
profession of homogenous individuals6 could mete out impartial justice,
its very existence undermines the goal of equality under the law. Justice
cannot be blind if it is imparted by a group that overwhelmingly shares a
common experience and appearance to the exclusion of others.
In 2006, John R. Dunne, as vice chair of the Committee for Modem
Courts in New York, testified at a public forum on judicial diversity held
by the minority leader of the New York State Senate. Advocating for the
governor's commitment to diversity on the New York State Court of
Appeals, Dunne stated that "[w]here the judiciary does not reflect the
diversity of the community it serves, public confidence in the judiciary is
undermined."7 He then referenced a survey sponsored by the
Commission to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections and
conducted by the Marist Institute for Public Opinion in which seventyone percent of all registered voters in New York State agreed that New
York State judges are fair and impartial, a sentiment shared by only
fifty-one percent of African American voters.8 The New York State Bar
Association has also relied on similar statistics, adding "that only sixty
percent of Latino voters ... in New York State trust our state's judges to
be fair and impartial." 9
Descriptive representation has great symbolic importance. Its
impact on racial and ethnic groups cannot be ignored. This is also true
for women. According to a 2011 report from the Center for Women in
Government and Civil Society ("CWGCS") at the Rockefeller College
6. Defined here as homogenous based on a small number of characteristics.
7. Judicial Diversity, FUND FOR MOD. CTS., http://modemcourts.org/programs-advocacy/
judicial-diversity (last visited July 24, 2016).
8. Id.
9. JUDICIAL SECTION, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, JUDICIAL DIVERSITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS
1(2014).
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of Public Affairs and Policy, State University of New York at Albany,
the empirical literature establishes that female representation in elected
and appointed offices, including the judiciary, matters.1" The report, in
pertinent part, provides:
Descriptive representation, or having a number of women judges who
are representative of the population they serve is believed to be of
critical symbolic and material importance, since it generates group
empowerment and leads to greater confidence in the judicial system
and in government in general. It has been shown that descriptive
representation can send signals that women (and minorities) are
respected and have a place in government. These messages can
increase trust, improve levels of participation and interest, enhance
perceived government legitimacy,
and combat political alienation of
1
under-represented groups.'
Further, I would add a fourth goal of diversity, which continues to
be researched, debated, and contested. This goal asserts that diversity
serves as a proxy to establish a system of justice structurally and
analytically sounder than the current system by enhancing the decisionmaking process. In other words, diversity not only holds the promise of
individual access in a system marked by equal opportunity, which
eventually will result in numerical balance or proportionality, but also
ensures a better system because it is based on heterogeneity or
difference, rather than homogeneity or sameness.
The arguments in support of diversity as a vehicle for improving
decision-making within our legal system are based, in part, on two
hypotheses. One hypothesis asserts that there must be a certain number
of individuals representative of a minority class in order for those
individuals to feel comfortable and be taken seriously within the larger
group. In a sense, it allows for their voices to develop and be heard.
Researchers note that one-third the membership of a group constitutes a
critical mass, which, in the context of female representation, "is defined
as the point at which the presence of women becomes significant enough
to instigate change in the stereotypical conception of gender roles.""2
However, critical mass is a concept that "has been applied in a wide
variety of contexts and settings, though all applications share a common
trait: the notion that relative numbers matter in terms of the dynamics of
demographically heterogeneous groups.' 3
10.

DINA REFKI ET AL., CTR. FOR WOMEN IN GOV'T & CIVIL SOC'Y, WOMEN IN FEDERAL

AND STATE-LEVEL JUDGESHIPS 1 (2011).

11. Id. (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 8.
13. Lissa Lamkin Broome et al., Does CriticalMass Matter? Views from the Boardroom, 34
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The other hypothesis purports that improved decision-making is
inherent in a diverse group, based on the ability to draw on experiences
that vary among individuals of different professional and personal
backgrounds. The data exploring this hypothesis appears somewhat
mixed. Some data supports the argument that judges of different races,
ethnicities, and genders may reach different conclusions. Some data
finds no support for such a conclusion. Some data finds limited areas in
which there is a statistically significant difference in decision-making
among judges of different racial groups and between men and women.
Below, examples of this last research category are referenced briefly
because studies have noted some anecdotal support for the outcomes
found in this data.
The Harvard Journal of Racial and Ethnic Justice published an
article in 2012, setting forth a recent empirical study of all reported
racial harassment cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196414 in the federal district courts of six representative
circuits between 2002 and 2008 (a total of 473 opinions), that found
the race of judges and the race, but not the gender, of plaintiffs
has a statistically significant impact on judicial decision-making in
employment discrimination cases. 15 Specifically, the data showed that
African American plaintiffs have substantially lower success rates than
Latino, Asian, and White plaintiffs, and that Latino 16 plaintiffs have the
highest success rates of the groups. 17 The data also showed that the
majority of cases were decided by White judges-no surprise given that
the majority of judges are Caucasian males-and further found that
plaintiffs had comparatively worse outcomes when appearing before
White and Latino judges than before African American judges.18
Plaintiffs were successful in 42.2% of the cases before African
American judges, against a baseline success rate of 22.2%, and
compared with a success rate of 20.6% before White judges and 15.6%
before Latino judges.' 9
Analyzing the interaction of the judges' and plaintiffs' race, the
study made three findings:
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2011).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
15. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, The Realism of Race in JudicialDecision Making: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of Plaintiffs' Race and Judges'Race, 28 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 91,

96 (2012).
16. This Article uses the term "Latino" throughout, except where referencing a direct
quotation.
17.

Id.at99-101.

18. Id. at 103-04.
19. Id.
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First and most notably, Hispanic plaintiffs succeed at the highest rates
in front of every judge group (African American judges 60%; Hispanic
judges 50%; White judges 32.5%), which helps account for their
overall success rate of 37% .... Second, White and African American

judges rule much more favorably for plaintiffs of their own race (samerace pairings) than of another race, with White judges and White
plaintiffs at 28%; and African American judges and African American
plaintiffs at 47%. Third, different-race pairings (excluding Hispanic

plaintiffs who are treated most favorably by all judges) have success
rates lower than the baseline (White judges and African American
plaintiffs at 19%; African American judges and White plaintiffs at
17%; Hispanic judges and White plaintiffs at 0% or African American

plaintiffs at 9.5%).20
This study confirmed earlier results by the same researchers who
stated that the results of their most recent study "do not appear to
support the formalism model of judicial decision-making, where judges'
legal analyses are considered largely a mechanical and value-neutral
exercise."21 Rather, the results indicated that "judicial decision-making
appears to be a more complicated, and human activity where judges'
backgrounds, including their race and their conscious or unconscious
worldview of other races, affect case outcomes." 22 They cautioned,
as other researchers have warned, that "judges typically exercise
discretion in a principled fashion, not in a strategic self-interested
way, thereby protecting judicial legitimacy." After all, "[judges] are
not 'merely politicians in robes."' 23 As a consequence, "consistent
with a 'principled discretion' version of a realism model of judicial
decision-making, it appears that the life experiences of judges of
different races result in different relevant 'pools of information' that
have real-world consequences for plaintiffs of different races in racial
harassment cases."24

The researchers and study authors concluded that "[a] more
integrated judiciary that is representative of American society would
expand judicial perspectives, prompt a more deliberative process,
and help assure more accountable and responsive decision-making
for 'citizens of all walks of life,' thus facilitating a more fullyfunctioning democracy. "25
20. Id.at 108.
21. Id. at 113.
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the
Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 195, 214 (2011)).
24. Id. at 115.
25. Id.
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In a 2010 study of the causal effects of sex on judging, researchers
examined thirteen legal areas ranging from disability law to sex
discrimination, to analyze whether a judge's gender affected decisionmaking.2 6 The researchers found that only in sex discrimination cases
did sex impact the outcomes. They stated:
[T]he probability of a judge deciding in favor of the party alleging
discrimination decreases by [ten] percentage points when the judge is a
male. Likewise, when a woman serves on a panel with men, the men
are significantly more likely to rule in favor of the rights litigant. More
generally, [the] findings are consistent with informational27accounts of
gendered judging and are inconsistent with several others.
The researchers subjected a preexisting data set, developed by Cass
Sunstein and his co-authors for a book published in 2006, to a propensity
score matching methodology. 28 Utilizing this expansive data base, the
researchers described several empirical results. They found that "almost
without exception, female and male judges do not reach different
2
decisions" within the thirteen legal subject areas9.
The one exception
they identified was that "[f]emale and male judges differ significantly in
their treatment of Title VII sex discrimination suits. On average, the
probability of female judges voting in favor of the plaintiff in a sex
discrimination case is around 0.10 higher than it is for male judges-a
difference with meaning."30
Notably, the researchers also found that while male judges
serving on a mixed-sex panel (a panel with female judges) did not
vote differently than male judges on all-male panels, with one
exception.3 As was the case with the data on the individual effects
on judging, the data on the effects on panels showed that "[flor
males at relatively average levels of ideology, the likelihood of a
liberal, pro-plaintiff vote increases by almost [eighty-five percent]
when sitting with a female judge."32 In light of these results, the
researchers concluded:
[T]he presence of women in the federal appellate judiciary rarely has
an appreciable empirical effect on judicial outcomes. Rarely, though, is
26. Christina Boyd et al., Untanglingthe Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 389, 397 (2010).
27. Id. at 397.
28. Id.; see CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
29. Boyd et al., supranote 26, at 401.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 402.
32.

Id. at 406.
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not never .... [W]e observe consistent and statistically significant
individual and panel effects in sex discrimination disputes: not only do
males and females bring distinct approaches to these cases, but the
presence of a female on a panel actually causes male judges to vote in
a way they otherwise would not-in favor of plaintiffs. Characterized
this way, [the] results are consistent with an informational account of
gendered judging; they also serve to reinforce
other studies that
33
identified gender effects in the employment area.
The data on judicial decision-making has also been recognized by the
New York State Bar Association, as provided in its 2012 report:
No one can seriously question that the life experiences of people
differ, and that those differences impact individuals' views and
perceptions. Men and women, and Caucasians and minorities, do not
always view the world in the same way. It is this common sense
premise that has shaped the increasing body of law protecting
defendants' fundamental right to a true jury of their peers. Every day
judges apply the law to the facts or real life experiences of the litigants
appearing before them; it is only logical that judges' own life
experiences may color their perceptions of those facts. Since more
cases are decided by judges than juries, it is just as critical to ensure
that the state's judiciary reflects the population it serves.
...There is a value in symbolic representation-seeing someone
who looks like you on the bench. Yet it is more than just the perception
of fairness that impacts judicial efficacy. It is the actual quality of
justice that suffers when judicial diversity is lacking. Although we
know this intuitively, empirical studies have also confirmed that
diverse judges decide certain types of cases differently than their white
male colleagues and that minority and female judges on appellate
benches can also influence the decisions of their colleagues and
34
improve the collective decision-making process.
These ideas are longstanding. In 1992, the Task Force on Minority
Representation on the Bench (commonly referred to as the Task Force
on Judicial Diversity), established by executive order 35 of then-Governor
Mario M. Cuomo, concluded that "diversity is vital because it is
required by our constitutional and legal commitment to inclusiveness
and because it greatly improves the ability of the judiciary to fulfill its
function. 3 6 The Task Force identified two key areas in which diversity

33. Id.at 406.
34. JUDICIAL SECTION, supranote 9, at 1-2.
35. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &REGS. tit. 9, § 4.149 (1991).
36. N.Y. TASK FORCE ON MINORITY REPRESENTATION ON THE BENCH, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
GovERNOR,TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL DIVERSITY REPORT 5 (1992).
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makes a difference. First, and according to the Task Force the "most
important" area, was the "improve[d] public confidence in the fairness
of the justice system," which thereby "strengthens the [r]ule of [l]aw."'37
Second, is the "improve[d] ... quality of judicial decisions." 38 The latter

is accomplished by expanding the experience of the bench. As the Task
Force stated:
For the law to develop in light of the experience of the whole
society, it is better if the bench is pluralistic, diverse and inclusive. The
experience of men and women, whites and racial minorities, rich and
poor, advantaged and disadvantaged all differ, as do the experiences of
persons of varying national origin, sexual preference or disability
status. A judiciary with jurisdiction over each and every person should
find wisdom in all those experiences and thereby keep the law rooted
in the experience of our whole society. Although this can happen
without the diversity of the bench being exactly proportional to the
diversity of the population, the judicial experience factor will more
accurately reflect the experience of the whole society if the diversity is
real and substantial.39
The impact of gender is similarly recognized and no less
meaningful, as supported by the CWGCS report: "[R]esearch has
documented that women's descriptive representation on elected and
appointed bodies can be correlated to substantive representation.
Women's unique experiences as women are believed to inform their
interpretation and shape the lens with which they make decisions as
judges especially in cases where women's experiences are central."4 °
Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson appointed in 1976 as the first woman on
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has said:
I think that when people ask if "being a woman" brings anything
special to the court, they really are asking whether there is any special
sensitivity that a person's background might bring to the court. My
gender--or, more properly, the experiences that my gender has forced
upon me-has, of course, made me sensitive to certain issues, both
legal and nonlegal. So have other parts of my background. My point is
that nobody is just a woman or a man. Each of us is a person with
diverse experiences. Each of us brings to the bench experiences that
affect our view of law and life and decision-making. The concept of a
collegial court is to bring together people who will have different life

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
REFKIETAL., supranote 10, at 1.
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of law and facts.
and legal experiences, who may have different views
41
If all the judges were the same, why have seven?

In addition to experience born of difference based on race,
ethnicity, gender, and other identity characteristics, there is also
experience born of the practice of law. In this vein, several U.S.
Supreme Court Justices appear to agree that diversity of legal practice
experience is important to an appellate court.
Referring to Justice Thurgood Marshall, a civil rights litigator and
icon, Justice Byron White stated that Justice Marshall "brought to the
conference table years of experience in an area that was of vital
importance to our work, experience that none of us could claim to
match."4 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor noted how Justice Marshall's
life and professional experiences brought an experience not otherwise
heard from the Supreme Court's bench:
Although all of us come to the Court with our own personal
histories and experiences, Justice Marshall brought a special
perspective. His was the eye of a lawyer who saw the deepest wounds
in the social fabric and used the law to heal them. His was the ear of a
counselor who understood the vulnerabilities of the accused and
established safeguards for their protection....
At oral arguments and conference meetings, in opinions and
dissents, Justice Marshall imparted not only his legal acumen but also
his life experiences, constantly pushing and prodding us to respond not
only to the persuasiveness of legal argument but also to the power of
moral truth.43
Alliance for Justice has argued:
[J]udges are the product of their background and experiences,
including their professional lives before taking the bench.... [W]hen
judges come from all comers of the legal profession-and particularly
when they've worked in the public interest, representing those whose
voices are otherwise rarely heard-they are equipped to understand the
before them, and to render more informed,
views of each litigant
44
thorough decisions.

41.

Shirley S. Abrahmson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L.

REv. 489, 493-94 (1984).
42. Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1216
(1992).
43. Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L.
REv. 1217, 1217 (1992).
44. ALL. FOR JUSTICE,

BROADENING

THE BENCH:

PROFESSIONAL

DIVERSITY

JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS 5 (2016), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/1
Diversity-Report.pdf
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As they point out, the data indicates that professional experience, at least
on the federal bench, is tilted against public interest service.45
It seems likely that the findings in these studies and the arguments
propounded by advocates for diversity will continue to be discussed and
debated. While some may believe the case has not yet been made for
diversity in the legal profession in furtherance of the fourth goal this
Article identifies, the private sector appears convinced that diversity
makes for better outcomes and increases profits. We need only read
the amici briefs submitted by fortune 500 businesses in Grutter v.
Bollinger for statements from the business community extolling the
virtues of a diverse workforce.46 One asserted that "[t]o be successful in
the global marketplace, multinational ... companies... must cultivate
and maintain a diverse workforce comprised of the most talented and
skilled people., 47 Another stated that "a diverse workforce creates a
competitive advantage by allowing a business to leverage the diverse
perspectives of its employees to improve decision-making and increase
productivity., 48 It quoted one commentator as saying, "[T]here has come
a uniform recognition by top management that diversity adds a
significantly valuable dimension to problem-solving and decisionmaking, and therefore that diverse groups possess important advantages
over homogeneous groups as units of creative and competitive
productivity., 49 Yet another company asserted:
[A]bundant evidence suggests that heterogeneous work teams create
better and more innovative products and ideas than homogeneous
teams. Homogeneity often causes teams to suffer from lock-step
"group think." The most innovative companies therefore deliberately
establish heterogeneous teams in order to "'create a marketplace of
of points of view need to be
ideas,' recognizing that a multiplicity
50
brought to bear on a problem."

45. Id. at 6.
46. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae Out of Time and Brief of BP America Inc.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02241, 02-516).
47. Id. at 7.
48. Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of Exxon Mobil Corp. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 4, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516).
49. Id. (quoting Robert L. Lattimer, The Case for Diversity in Global Business, and the
Impact of Diversity on Team Performance, COMPETITIVENESS REV., Jan. 1, 1988, at 317.

50. Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents 24, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (citations omitted) (quoting ROSABETH MOSS
KANTER,

THE

CHANGE

MASTER:

INNOVATIONS FOR PRODUCTIVITY

IN THE AMERICAN

CORPORATION 167 (1983)).
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If diversity matters for all the reasons articulated by scholars and
leaders within the legal profession, and by the business community, then
how have the profession and the larger society responded? Is diversity
a priority? If so, what have we done to bring us closer to diversity that
is "real and substantial"? How have the demographics of the United
States and the profession shaped these efforts? What does our report
card look like?
To explore these questions, we must look at the status of our
profession, and just on the numbers, it makes clear that there are great
challenges ahead. In 2015, according to the Federal Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 34.5% of lawyers were women, 4.6% were African American,
5.1% were Latino, and 4.8% were Asian-Pacific American. 1 The
numbers are clearly under-representative of these groups as well as the
percentage of women in society. Turning specifically to the judiciary,
the data shows that women constitute half of the United States
population and approximately 50% of the Juris Doctor degrees awarded,
yet women remain under-represented on the bench. 2 Currently, of the
federal judiciary bench, women account for approximately 33% of active
federal trial court judges, yet six districts have never had a female
judge.5 3 Women constitute 35% of circuit courts of appeal judges with at
least two circuits significantly under-represented. 4 Women are 33.3% of
U.S. Supreme Court justices.55 The numbers are smaller for women of
Color, with eighty-three active federal judges, twelve of which are on
the circuit courts of appeal. 6 Six circuit courts, including the Second
Circuit, have no women of Color as active judges.5 7
In New York State courts, women have recently passed the onethird mark. Women account for approximately 35% of all state court
judges, or about 434 out of approximately 1247 judges.58 Women are
40% of the Appellate Division of the N.Y. Supreme Court, with
representation varying widely by judicial department. In the First
Department, 48.4% are women, in the Second Department 51.5%, in the

51. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, FED. STATISTICAL SYS. OF THE U.S., EMPLOYED
PERSONS BY DETAILED OCCUPATION, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC OR LATINO ETHNICITY 3 (2013),

http://www.bls.gov/cps/aa2013/cpsaat 11.pdf.
52.

WAY TO
.23.pdf.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, WOMEN IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: STILL A LONG

Go 1 (2016), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/JudgesCourtsWomeninFedJud6
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
JUDICIAL SECTION, supra note 9, at 54.
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Third Department 23.2%, and in the Fourth Department 17.7%. 9 The
2011 CWGCS report, discussed above, ranked New York twelfth based
on women's share of federal and state judgeships, which at the time was
30.9%. (Idaho ranked fifty-first with 11.3% women, and Vermont
ranked first with 39.6% women). 6' Notably, today, our state's high court,
the New York State Court of Appeals, leads our state bench. A majority
of the court is female, with women holding four of the seven seats on the
court, or 57% of our bench. 6' This is the third time in the court's history
where women have been in the majority.62
In 2014, according to a New York State Bar Association report, the
total percentage of judges of Color in the New York State court system
was 19.3% (about 239 out of 1247). 63 Among our state's judiciary, 144
judges were African American, 72 Latino, 22 Asian, and 1 was Native
American.' In the Appellate Division, 27.3% of judges are People of
Color, or fifteen jurists, of which seven were female, eight African
American, five Hispanic, and two Asian.65
The Appellate Division, First Department was comprised of
fourteen justices, of whom seven were People of Color-three African
American, three Latino, and one Asian.66 In the Second Department,
thirty-five percent of the judges were People of Color, or seven out of
the twenty justices, comprised of four African Americans, two Latinos,
and one Asian.67 In the Third Department, there were no judges who are
People of Color.66 Finally, in the Fourth Department, there was one sole
justice of Color, and she is African American.69 There were no Native
American justices in the Appellate Division. The presiding justices of
the First and Second Departments were People of Color, Latino and

59. Id.
60. REFKI ET AL., supranote 10, at 7.
61. See CT. APPEALS STATE N.Y., https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps (last visited July 24,
2016).
62. From 2003 to 2009, the female majority of the New York State Court of Appeals
consisted of Chief Judge Kaye, Senior Associate Judge Ciparick, and Judges Graffeo and Read.
From 2013 to 2015, the female majority consisted of Judge Read, Judge Rivera, Judge AbdusSalaam, and either Judge Graffeo or Judge Stein. Recently, and for the second time in the court's
history, the Governor appointed a woman as Chief Judge. The appointment of Janet DiFiore
maintained a female majority on the court.
63. JUDICIAL SECTION, supranote 9, at 54.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 53-54.
66. Id. at 57.
67. Id.
68. Id. However, in 2016, the Governor appointed the first African American female justice to
the Third Department bench, Sharon Aarons.
69. Id.
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Asian, respectively, and the presiding justice of the Third Department
was a white woman.
If we consider national numbers, we see that men constitute half
the U.S. population, yet constitute almost seventy-four percent of all
federal and state judgeships. No doubt the judiciary is an exclusive
club-one based on qualifications. However, exclusiveness obtained and
maintained by selection protocols that result in racial, ethnic, and gender
disparities is far from beneficial to society.
Where does this leave us? In Women, Judging and the Judiciary:
From Difference to Diversity, Erika Rackley argues that "who the judge
is matters," and she states:
Male judges, just as women, resort to their own perspectives,
experiences and values when deciding cases and insofar as this has
gone unnoticed this is largely because the absence of judicial diversity
has meant that we have not been exposed to a wider array of
arguments ....[W]omen judges will on occasion judge differently to
their male colleagues because there will be times when they will and
are required to draw on their own (different) perspectives. The mistake
is to think that male judges have not been doing
this all along and to
70
think-in either case-that this is problematic.
As the number of women and People of Color on the judiciary increases
so will the ability "to put these statements to the test. 7 1 It is certain that
in the future, with newfound information and insights, we will consider
the effects of diversity in ways not currently understood or appreciated.

70.

ERICA RACKLEY, WOMEN, JUDGING AND THE JUDICtARY:

FROM DIFFERENCE TO

196 (2013); see Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the
Aspirationsfor Our Judges, 61 S.CAL.L. REV. 1877, 1928-33 (1988).
71. RACKLEY, supra note 70, at 196.
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